Call for papers

Contributed Talks for FE2019

Formal Ethics 2019 will feature a single track for contributed talks of 40-45 minutes. Authors should submit an extended abstract (1000 words max, pdf format) via easychair: by February 19th, 2019, 23h59 (CET).

Submissions in all areas of formal ethics, broadly construed, are welcome. For Formal Ethics 2019, submissions related to joint responsibility and collective decision-making are particularly welcome (cf. infra, the specific topic for this edition).


Contributions need not be formal in nature but should show familiarity with applying formal tools and results to ethical investigations. We aim at an inclusive conference in which speakers at different stages of their careers (including PhD students and post-docs) participate. We also aim at a strong representation of female scholars. An issue of a specialist journal, dedicated to the conference theme, is being planned.


Specific topic for FE2019: “joint responsibility and collective decision-making”.

We specifically welcome submissions on the theme of joint responsibility and collective decision-making. These notions are under investigation in various fields including computer science, (meta)ethics, and political theory. Our aim is to further stimulate the synergy between these different fields, and to provide a forum for both conceptual, ethical, and formal disputes on questions such as:

  • Does collective responsibility presuppose a notion of (intentional) collective agency?
  • Does either notion reduce to a suitable configuration of individual attitudes or properties?
  • How does or can a group deliberate towards a collective decision problem, i.e. how is the agenda for collective decision-making set?
  • How should groups reach a decision, once they have settled on a set of alternatives to choose from?
  • (How) can one compute the distribution of responsibility in a multi-agent system?
  • How do collective responsibility and collective decision-making relate? Does the latter make for a stronger, or rather for a weaker type of collective responsibility?
  • How should one interpret or overcome well-known limitative results regarding preference aggregation (cf. Arrow, Sen), collective decision-making (cf. Dietrich & List) and joint responsibility (cf. Braham & Van Hees)?